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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

4 April 1979

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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)	:
Contents	2
Briefs and Comments	
China - USSR: Abrogation of Friendship $Treaty$	2
Iran: Turkomen Rebellion	4 2
Iran: Oil Production	5
Italy: Communist Party Congress	7
Namibia: Reactions to Latest Truce Proposals .	8
Developed Countries: Cuts in Nuclear Energy Programs	9
Pakistan: Bhutto Executed	10
Chad: Another Round of Peace Talks	11
Portugal: Social Democrats Split	11



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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS
CHINA-USSR: Abrogation of Friendship Treaty China formally announced yesterday that it will allow the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance to expire on 11 April 1980. The announcement marks a symbolic turning point in Sino-Soviet relations.
The treaty was signed in 1950 after long, difficult negotiations between Stalin and Mao Zedong and it was the basic document of the two countries' relationship until the 1960s when the Sino-Soviet split widened. By announcing its intention to end the treaty now, Beijing forgoes the opportunity to use it for tactical advantage against the West and adds another major impediment to any future improvement in relations with Moscow.

The end of the treaty became virtually inevitable last year when it became a negotiating issue with the Japanese. Because it explicitly named Japan as a joint enemy, Tokyo had questioned the status of the Sino-Soviet treaty before agreeing to a Peace and Friendship Treaty with China. Beijing committed itself in some manner to breaking the Soviet treaty.

China's direct and formal method of ending the treaty suggests it wished to leave no doubt about the firmness of its opposition to the USSR. The Chinese referred to the "differences of principle" that continue to divide the two countries but said these differences "should not hamper the maintenance and development of normal state relations."

The Soviets appear to have been prepared for the denunciation. President Brezhnev told US visitors in January that the USSR would not break the treaty and that China "will have to bear the entire onus." Initial Soviet reaction to the announcement assigned full responsibility to China for the decline of relations.

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The Chinese announcement reported that China included in its notification to the Soviets a proposal "that negotiations be held . . . for the solution of outstanding issues and the improvement of relations between the two countries." China has not released the text of the call for talks. It is unlikely that the Chinese would alter their previously stiff preconditions to negotiations.

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IRAN: Turkomen Rebellion

The week-long fighting between Turkomen tribal rebels and progovernment Islamic militiamen apparently ended yesterday when, after a cease-fire, an armed force composed of various military and irregular units moved into Gonbad-e Qabus. The continuing civil disorder fomented by tribal groups in Iran's outlying provinces may strengthen the hand of government leaders who want to rebuild the armed forces.

We do not know what military forces have actually arrived in Gonbad-e Qabus. The armed forces have been in general disarray since the revolution. Press reports of the presence in Gonbad-e Qabus of tanks and armored personnel carriers suggest, however, that some military units and Islamic militia were able to respond to orders from the Ground Forces command. The government probably hopes that a show of strength is all that will be necessary to deal with the Turkomen tribesmen and that military measures will not be needed.

Continued ethnic uprisings may change the thoughts of many Khomeini followers who have argued against the revitalization of the military. Prominent religious leader Ayatollah Shariat-Madari in a recent speech probably echoed the views of other key leaders in recommending that Iran have a strong army. The presence of leftist Peoples Fedayeen militiamen with the rebel tribesmen doubtless gives many government leaders a sense of urgency about rebuilding the military.

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IRAN: Oil Production

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Iranian oil production fluctuated between 2.5 million and 3 million barrels a day during the last week of March. Production will have to rise to about 3.5 million barrels a day if Iran is to meet its contracted export commitments for the second quarter of 1979. The National Iranian Oil Company is under strong pressure from revolutionary workers' committees, and a widespread shakeup of its senior personnel may be imminent.

//The production level recorded last week--about half the prerevolutionary level--allows for the export of about 2.3 million barrels a day of crude. Iran reportedly has already contracted to export 2.8 million barrels a day during the period between 1 April and 30 June. A senior official of the oil company recently told a Western counterpart that the government has not yet determined its revenue requirements and, therefore, has not advised Iranian oil officials on appropriate production levels.//

Executives of the Iranian National Oil Company who are carryovers from the old regime are being subjected to strong and frequent criticism from the revolutionary committees. Managing Director Nazih capitulated to pressures from the committees by issuing a statement asserting that he had not personally confirmed any company executives and that changes would probably be made soon.

Few company employees have been dismissed or imprisoned thus far. Some senior staff personnel, however, are not reporting to work, perhaps thinking they will be fired when they do so. At the oil company headquarters at Ahvaz, there is almost total inactivity. Many workers believe that the current political situation is so unstable that inactivity is their safest course.

US Embassy sources report that there is no unanimity of allegiance to Khomeini among workers in the major Khuzestan oilfields. Leftists opposed both to Khomeini and to the Bazargan government remain a significant force with considerable capacity for disruption.

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ITALY: Communist Party Congress

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Italian Communist chief Berlinguer sounded the party's probable election campaign themes yesterday in a speech closing the Communist Party congress. Berlinguer sharply attacked the ruling Christian Democrats and appealed for cooperation between his party and the Socialists.

We do not yet have information on the doctrinal and personnel changes under consideration at the congress. Preliminary press reports suggest, however, that such questions may have been overshadowed by the theme of party unity and Communist electoral rhetoric. Berlinguer again insisted on cabinet seats for his party and blamed the impending election on the Christian Democrats' refusal to meet these demands. He also called on the Socialists to campaign with the Communists under the banner of "leftist unity" in order to take votes away from the Christian Democrats.

Berlinguer's speech is not an appeal for a postelectoral "leftist alternative government." His call
for "leftist unity" is a more subtle tactical move, designed to emphasize a theme popular with rank-and-file
Communists at the Congress and to deflect Socialist attacks on his party during the campaign. Berlinguer's
ultimate objective may be to prevent the Socialists from
considering a coalition with the Christian Democrats-which would exclude the Communists from the government-following the election.

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NAMIBIA: Reactions to Latest Truce Proposals

South African Prime Minister Botha and his Foreign Minister have ended their discussions with Namibian political leaders on results of the talks on Namibia in New York two weeks ago. Botha asked the Namibians to decide within a week whether to accept the Western proposals, which partially meet South Africa's objections to the truce arrangements that the UN Secretary General announced in late February. The tenor of Botha's comments suggests he is preparing for further hard bargaining.

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The South African Prime Minister addressed a closed session of the Namibian Constituent Assembly and also met with leaders of the political groups that boycotted the election of the Assembly last December. Botha was said to have urged Assembly members to reach a consensus with other leaders on how to respond to the latest Western proposals.

Several Western envoys who met with Namibian leaders shortly before Botha's arrival found a consensus that a truce should provide for effective monitoring of guerrillas in Angola and Zambia belonging to the South-West African People's Organization, and should not allow guerrillas inside Namibia to set up bases and keep their arms. The principal centrist parties appear close to agreement on a compromise proposal—that guerrillas who submit to UN monitoring inside Namibia be disarmed within a month of a cease-fire.

Botha appears to have the backing of all the principal Namibian political groups except SWAPO for further negotiations, as long as he focuses primarily on measures for disarming any SWAPO forces that emerge inside Namibia after a cease-fire. As long as negotiations show progress, the Constituent Assembly probably can be held merely to planning for eventual independence. If negotiations prove fruitless, the other leaders are likely to feel compelled to participate in an "internal settlement."

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DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: Cuts in Nuclear Energy Programs

Even before the accident at the Pennsylvania nuclear power plant, projections of future nuclear capacity in the developed countries were being revised downward. Delays in the construction of nuclear power plants--caused mainly by regulatory and environmental factors--have become increasingly pronounced despite widespread forecasts of a tight energy market in the early to mid-1980s.

The International Energy Agency says that nuclear 25X1 capacity in 1985 in countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development will be 214,000 megawatts, down 17 percent from the previous official OECD projections made in December 1977 and one-third less than an OECD projection made in January 1977. More drastic revisions have been made in projections for 1990. In the year since its last estimate, the OECD cut 145,000 megawatts from projected 1990 capacity. Even though there have been slippages in the construction schedules of nuclear reactors, developed countries in 1978 purchased or signed letters of intent for 20 reactors with a total capacity of 23,400 megawatts.

At the end of 1978, 182 nuclear power reactors with a total capacity of 95,400 megawatts were operating in developed countries. These plants produced 540 billion kilowatt hours of electricity, an amount that would have required 2.6 million barrels of oil per day if produced in oil-fired generating units. The projected 1985 capacity of about 214,000 megawatts represents a potential contribution to OECD energy supplies of the equivalent of 5.7 million barrels per day of oil.

Initial reaction abroad to the nuclear accident in Pennsylvania has been one of official reassurances on the one hand and more vocal opposition by antinuclear spokesmen on the other. Official French statements were designed to assure the country that such an accident could never occur in France and to reaffirm the country's large commitment to nuclear energy. Japanese Prime Minister Ohira stated that his country has no intention of changing its energy policy, heavily dependent on the growth of nuclear energy.

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PAKISTAN: Bhutto Executed

Former Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto was hanged in Rawalpindi today, according to a Karachi daily newspapers and Western wire service reports quoting official sources. The country was calm yesterday, despite widespread rumors that the execution was imminent, but news of the execution—which has not yet been announced officially—could well bring a violent reaction by Bhutto's followers, many of whom probably have been quiet so far to avoid decreasing the chances for clemency. In recent days, the government instituted special security measures in preparation for the execution. Earlier, it had detained large numbers of potential demonstration leaders. Even if the government is successful in preventing serious violence, Bhutto is likely to remain a major political issue in Pakistan for years.

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CHAD: Another Round of Peace Talks

Leaders of Chad's recently installed provisional government are meeting again this week in Nigeria to work out a timetable for transferring power to an elected civilian government. A delegation will attend from a Libyan-backed Muslim rebel faction that has been active militarily in eastern Chad, but which was excluded from the peace negotiations last month. Representatives of Chad's neighbors -- Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Libya, and Sudan--have a proposal for an interim government that would draft a new constitution and hold a national election within a year. During the transition period, French troops would be withdrawn gradually as Nigerian forces assume responsibility for maintaining the cease-fire in In addition, the military forces of the various Chadian factions would be integrated into a single national army; this would probably be a principal sticking point.


PORTUGAL: Social Democrats Split

The Social Democratic Party--Portugal's second largest--appears irreparably split over party leader Sa Carneiro's decision to abstain rather than support the government's budget, which parliament rejected two weeks ago. The split increases the chances that Prime Minister Mota Pinto can get a slightly revised budget through the legislature. According to Sousa Franco, the moderate leader of the dissident legislative faction, most of the dissidents will continue in parliament as independents, possibly linking themselves to other independents and to the Center Democrats in a pro - Mota Pinto alliance.

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